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Articles
Characterizing Military Separation
Benefits At Dissolution in California
Glenn C. Jones*
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1990, responding to dramatic changes in the
world's geo-political makeup, Congress initiated a massive draw-
down of active duty armed forces.! To effect the drawdown,
Congress modified the existing statute governing involuntary sepa-
ration pay and enacted two other programs to encourage military
members to voluntarily leave active duty before completing a
twenty year career.
Unfortunately, many of the large number of service members,
who will leave active duty under one of these three programs
between now and 1995, will contemplate or pursue marital disso-
lution, or will be recently divorced. In many cases, the military
separation benefit will form the bulk of the family's assets. There-
fore, it is incumbent to be aware of how these programs may affect
active duty or former service members or their spouses.
* B.S., Wayland Baptist University, 1979; J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School
of Law, 1991; Major, USAF (Ret.) at his retirement from the Air Force, Mr. Jones was assigned as
Attorney Advisor, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Mather Air Force Base, California. Mr. Jones
is a member of the California State Bar. The author wishes to dedicate this article to his wife Alyce,
and sons, Aaron and Matthew.
1. See infra notes 11-17 (discussing the reduction in armed forces).
2. 10 U.S.C. § 1174 (1991) (involuntary separation pay); id. § 1174a (1991) (special
separation benefits); id. § 1175 (1991) (voluntary separation incentive).
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In California, military separation pay has been characterized as
the separate property of the military member? However, Congress'
1990 amendments4 to the statute governing separation pay could
alter that characterization. In light of those amendments, the vitality
of In re Marriage of Kuzmiak,6 California's only case to address
the issue of military separation pay, is now subject to question. In
Kuzmiak, the husband, an Air Force Captain, was involuntarily
released from active duty in 1983 and received $30,000 in sepa-
ration pay under the terms of 10 U.S.C. § 1174. He later enlisted
so he could quality for retirement benefits after twenty years of
service. His former wife claimed his separation pay was community
property. The court of appeals held that separation pay is the sepa-
rate property of the servicemember.
Additionally, the characterization of the recently enacted
Special Separation Benefits (SSB)7 and Voluntary Separation
Incentives (VSI), 8 upon maritial dissolution, is also an unanswered
question under California law. This Article will explore whether
post-1990 separation pay, SSB, and VSI, should be characterized
as community or separate property in California upon maritial
dissolution.
In Section I, this Article will examine the events that caused
Congress to amend the separation pay statute9 in 1990 and enact
SSB and VSI in 1991 to help shrink the size of the active duty
armed forces. Next, for the benefit of those unfamiliar with military
compensation issues, Section II will highlight the contours of the
law concerning three other important aspects of military compen-
sation: military retired pay, "disposable" retired pay, and disability
3. See generally In re Marriage of Kuzmiak, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1152, 1158, 222 Cal. Rptr.
644, 647 (1986) (holding that the separation pay of an unmarried service member is his or her
separate property), review denied, cert. denied sub nom, 479 U.S. 885 (1986).
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Div. A,
Title V, Part A, § 501, 104 Stat. 1549 (1990) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1174 (1991)).
5. 10 U.S.C. § 1174 (1991).
6. 176 Cal. App. 3d 1152, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1986), review denied, cert. denied sub norn,
479 U.S. 885 (1986).
7. 10 U.S.C. § 1174a (1991).
8. Id. § 1175 (1991).
9. Id. § 1174 (1991).
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pay. Section II will also examine how Congress, the United States
Supreme Court, and California courts have responded to develop-
ments in these areas. Section HI will review legislation enacted by
Congress to effect the drawdown of military forces. Section IV will
explore separation pay under 10 U.S.C. § 1174 and consider the
only California case on point, In re Marriage of Kuzmiak.'0 This
will establish a framework for the discussion in Section V of post-
1990 separation pay, SSB, and VSI, and whether they should be
characterized as separate or community property.
Based on Congress' well-documented concern to care for the
military family during the rapid drawdown of active duty forces,
the inescapable conclusions are that these benefits should be char-
acterized as community property in California and that Kuzmiak is
outdated and should be discarded.
I. THE DRAWD OWN
Responding to dramatic world events, Congress cut 129,500
service members from active duty forces in fiscal year 1991." In
fiscal years 1992 and 1993, Congress enacted even more dramatic
cuts in the active duty force structure. 12 By the end of fiscal year
1993, the United States will reduce its active duty armed forces
from 2,076,405 to 1,766,500 members. This reduction of approxi-
mately 280,000 members is a fifteen percent cutback in the active
duty forces. The force reduction is in response to the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, German
reunification, and a diminished nuclear threat. 3 More reductions
10. 176 Cal. App. 3d 1152, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1986), review denied, cert. denied sub non,
479 U.S. 885 (1986).
11. See generally H.R. REP. No. 665, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2991 (providing figures for the proposed reduction in force).
12. See infra Table 1.
13. H.R. REP. No. 665, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989.
Congress noted:
With the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, the diminished threat in Europe, and the
enormous Federal deficit, the nation can no longer afford to maintain a large Cold War-
era standing military on foreign soil. By mid-decade, the size of the active force-just
over two million men and women in uniform today-may well shrink by at least 25
percent by mid-decade....
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are anticipated through fiscal year 1995.14 To help achieve a large
portion of these reductions, Congress significantly amended the
existing separation pay statute in 1990,"5 and enacted SSB 16 and
VS117 in 1991. The goal is to shape the armed forces to meet
post-Cold War requirements. Table 1 depicts how the drawdown
will impact the armed forces through fiscal year 1993.
Table 1. ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1990-199318
SERVICE FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 DECREASE
ARMY 744,169 675,669 660,700 598,900 -145,269 (19.5%)
NAVY 590,501 570,501 551,400 535,800 -54,701 (9,26%)
MARINES 196,735 192,235 188,000 181,900 -14,835 (7.5%)
AIR FORCE 545,000 508,500 486,800 449,900 -95,100 (17.4%)
TOTAL 2,076,405 1,946,905 1,886,400 1,766,500 -309,905 (14.9%)
In order to understand the impact of these drawdowns on those
separating from the armed forces, the reader must have a grasp of
the principles of military compensation.
In making this recommendation, the committee is mindful of the unprecedented
quality of the young men and women in uniform today and of the need to ensure that the
force drawdown is accomplished in a balanced and equitable fashion that will preserve
the integrity of the military, maintain adequate force readiness, and cushion the blow for
adversely affected career personnel.
Id
14. See id. (stating that "By mid-decade, the size of the active force-just over two million
men and women in uniform today-may well shrink by at least 25% ... ").
15. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Div. A,
Title V, Part A, § 501, 104 Stat. 1549 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1174 (1991)).
16. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190,
Div. A, Title VI, Part F, § 661(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1394 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1174a (1991)).
17. Id. § 662(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1396 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1175 (1991)).
18. Id., Title IV, Part A, § 401, 105 Stat. 1349 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 115 (1991)). See
generally H.R. REP. No. 101-665, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2991.
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I. COMPONENTS OF MILITARY COMPENSATION
Military compensation is a thicket of base pays,19 special
pays,20 allowances,21 and bonuses.22 While on active duty, mili-
tary members earn their pay and allowances monthly.
A military member generally qualifies for retired pay after
serving on active duty for twenty years.' At that time, the retiree
will receive a specified portion of the retiree's basic pay on a
monthly basis for the rest of the retiree's life. For example, a
Major who retires at twenty years with a basic monthly pay of
$4,000 will receive gross retirement pay of $2,000 a month.24
An indirect component of regular military compensation is dis-
ability pay. It is awarded to a service member or retiree based on
an assessed level of service-connected disability and is paid by the
Department of Veterans Affairs. 25 Retired pay, if received, is off-
set in an amount equal to disability pay received. For example, a
disabled retiree who is entitled to receive $1,000 a month in retired
pay, and is also eligible to receive $300 a month in disability bene-
19. 37 U.S.C. § 201-207, 209 (1988); id. § 1009 (1988).
20. lid §§ 301-307, 310-316 (1988).
21. Id. §§ 401-425, 427-432 (1988).
22. Id §§ 308a-308i (1988).
23. See 10 U.S.C. § 3911 (1956) (providing qualifications for entitlement to retirement pay
for Army officers); id. § 3914 (1956) (Army enlisted members); id § 1293 (1956) (Army, Navy and
Marine warrant officers); id. § 6323 (1956) (Navy and Marine officers); id § 6330 (1950) (Navy and
Marine enlisted members); id § 8911 (1956) (Air Force officers); id. § 8914 (1956) (Air Force
enlisted members). Congress has also authorized military members to retire at 15 years of service
instead of the customary twenty years. Pub. L. No. 102-484, Title XLIV, Subtitle A, § 4403, 106
Stat. 2702-2704 (1992). Congress designed this as "a temporary additional force management tool
with which to effect the drawdown of military forces" ending on October 1, 1995. Id.
24. Members who were on active duty on or before September 7, 1980 receive one-half their
base pay at retirement, plus two and one-half percent per year of service over 20 years to a maximum
of seventy-five percent 10 U.S.C. § 1406 (1986). Members who entered active duty after September
7, 1980, compute their retired pay by averaging the base pay they received for their last 36 months
on active duty. Id. They receive one-half this amount plus two and one-half percent per year of
service over 20 years to a maximum of seventy-five percent. Id § 1407 (1986). Members who
entered active duty after July 31, 1986 compute their retired pay the same as post-September 7, 1980
retirees, except that if the member is less than 62 years of age at retirement, and has served less than
30 years, that member's multiplier is reduced by one percent for each year of service less than 30
years. Id. § 1409 (1986). There is a provision for recomputation and catch-up when the retiree
reaches age 62. Id. § 1410 (1986).
25. 38 U.S.C. § 5305 (1991).
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fits, must waive $300 of retired pay to receive the disability pay.
However, the $300 disability pay is tax exempt.2 6 This makes dis-
ability pay a highly attractive option for the disabled retiree. Before
discussing how "disposable" retired pay and disability pay are char-
acterized at dissolution, let us first turn to a brief overview of
retired military pay.
A. Retired Pay
In 1974, the California Supreme Court held in In re Marriage
of Fithian27 that military retired pay was community property and
subject to division by California courts at divorce.28 However, in
the 1981 landmark case McCarty v. McCarty,29 the United States
Supreme Court held that military retired pay was the separate prop-
erty of the retiree and not subject to division by state courts at
divorce.30 Following the McCarty decision, Congress enacted the
Federal Uniformed Service Former Spouse's Protection Act
(USFSPA), 3' which was designed to overturn the effects of
McCarty and return to the states the power to treat disposable
retired pay in accordance with state law.32 In fact, USFSPA was
made retroactive to the day before McCarty was decided.33
Almost all states now recognize military retired pay as a marital
26. la § 5301(d) (1958).
27. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
28. Id. 10 Cal. 3d at 604, 517 P.2d at 457, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
29. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
30. lI. at 233 ("State courts are not free to reduce the amounts that Congress has determined
are necessary for the retired member.").
31. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
32. See generally Lt. Col. Jeffrey S. Guilford, Exploring the Labyrinth: Current Issues Under
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 132 Mn. L. REv. 43 (1991). For recent
developments in McCarty-related California case law, see Berry v. Berry, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1155,
265 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1989) and In re Marriage of Curtis, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145
(1992), both dealing with retired military pay as an omitted asset.
33. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982). This section provides:
Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired or retainer
pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property
solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the
law of the jurisdiction of such court.
Id. McCarty was decided on June 26, 1981. McCarty v. McCarty, 43 U.S. 210 (1981).
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asset subject to division at divorce.3 Alabama is the lone
exception.35
However, we also need to examine "disposable" retired pay
since USFSPA and the recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in Mansell v. Mansel3 6 and Rose v. Rose37 define how
much retired and disability pay a court may divide at dissolution.
B. What Is Disposable Pay?
USFSPA defines "disposable" pay as the total monthly retired
pay minus certain deductions such as, monies owed the United
States, offsets due to receiving disability pay, and payments for
survivor's annuities.38 It became controversial when state courts
sought to divide retired pay and disability pay at dissolution. In
Casas v. Thompson, 9 the California Supreme Court interpreted
the disposable pay language in the then-effective language of
USFSPA as merely a procedural limitation on payment methods
and not a substantive invasion of California's right to enforce its
34. Major J. Connor, Family Law Note, State-by-State Analysis of the Divisibility of Military
Retired Pay, ARMY LAW, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-50-234, May, 1992, at 37.
35. See Tinsley v. Tinsley, 431 So. 2d 1304, 1307 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (holding that "under
Alabama law, military retirement benefits cannot be considered as marital property and may not be
included in an award of alimony in gross or in a division of property. It may be considered only as
a source of income regarding periodic alimony."); see also Phillips v. Phillips, 489 So. 2d 592, 596
(Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (awarding wife half of her husband's gross retired pay as alimony).
36. 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
37. 481 U.S. 619 (1987). The Supreme Court upheld Tennessee's law which allowed
Tennessee courts to reach a veteran's disability payments to enforce a child support order, holding
that neither the Veterans' Benefits provisions of Title 38 nor the provisions of the Child Support
Enforcement Act at Title 42 indicated unequivocally that a veteran's disability benefits were solely
for the veteran's support. Id. at 636.
38. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (1991). In 1991, Congress restructured USFSPA's definition of
"disposable retired pay" to mean the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled to
minus: (1) amounts which the member owes the United States for previous overpayments and
recoupments; (2) amounts deducted as a result of forfeiture due to a court-martial or as a result of
a waiver of retired pay to receive disability (for medically retired members, the percentage of
disability they were determined to have at retirement is not excluded) and (3) amounts deducted to
fund survivor's annuity. Id This amendment deleted exclusions for federal, state, and local tax
withholdings, and withholdings under 26 U.S.C § 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue Code. L
39. 42 Cal. 3d 131, 149, 720 P.2d 921, 932, 228 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44 (1986).
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domestic relations laws.' The court found that, "USFSPA is not
inconsistent with a division of gross, rather than disposable, mili-
tary retired pay. ' 41 Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Lucas
wrote the majority opinion, in which he justified the court's deci-
sion that total retired pay was divisible42 and that USFSPA
restricted only garnishments of retired pay.43 The court held, "in
California the military retiree's gross pay is a community asset sub-
ject to equal division."'
However, three years later in Mansell v. Mansell,45 the United
States Supreme Court overruled this holding by concluding that
Congress intended to preempt state family law in this area.46 The
United States Supreme Court noted that Congress had "directly and
specifically" legislated in the area of domestic relations. 47 The
Court held that while USFSPA grants state courts the affirmative
power to divide military retirement pay either as the separate prop-
erty of the member or as community property, its language is both
precise and limited.4 The Court noted that "under the Act's plain
and precise language, state courts have been granted the authority
to treat disposable retired pay as community property; they have
not been granted the authority to treat total retired pay as com-
munity property. 49 With that issue settled, at least for the
moment, let us examine how the courts have wrestled with the
division of disability pay.
40. Id (noting "the disposable earnings limitation [of USFSPA] does not affect the size of the
retiree's legal obligation to the ex-spouse, but only places limitations on monies that can be directly
collected from the government employer in a pay period.").
41. Id. 42 Cal. 3d at 151, 720 P.2d at 933, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
42. IM 42 Cal. 3d at 148, 720 P.2d at 931, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 43 (stating: "The concept of
'disposable' pay of income has nothing to do with the characterization of an asset. The amount of
retired pay which is 'disposable' will change, perhaps yearly or even monthly. This inevitable
periodic variance does not change the nature or value of the pension asset which was previously
acquired by the community.").
43. Id. 42 Cal. 3d at 151, 720 P.2d at 933, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
44. Id. at 151, 720 P.2d at 933, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46.
45. 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
46. Id. at 594-95.
47. Id. at 587.
48. Id. at 588.
49. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
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C. Disability Pay
Even though a former spouse may be entitled to a portion of
retired pay, a retiree's decision to waive retired pay for disability
pay can adversely affect the former spouse's entitlement. Although
in Mansell the United States Supreme Court concluded that a
spouse is entitled to a share of retired pay, the Court also held that
disability retired pay is not a divisible community property asset."
Courts have struggled with the consequences of a retiree's uni-
lateral decision to waive retired pay in order to receive disability
pay. In the 1978 California case of In re Marriage of Stenquist,51
the husband became disabled while on active duty.5" When he
retired, he received his retired pay as disability pay. 3 During dis-
solution proceedings four years later, the trial court divided his
retired disability pay as community property, and the husband
appealed.54 The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court
saying, "to permit the husband by unilateral election of a 'dis-
ability' pension, to 'transmute community property into his own
separate property,' is to negate the protective philosophy of the
community property law as set out in previous decisions of this
court."5 This holding of Stenquist stood until 1989 when the
United States Supreme Court decided Mansell.
5 6
In Mansell v. Mansell,57 a case that arose in California, the
United States Supreme Court held that, "the Former Spouses'
Protection Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as
property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has
been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits."58 This over-
50. Id.
51. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
52. Id. at 783, 582 P.2d at 98, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
53. Id He could have taken regular retirement at 65% of his basic pay, or disability pay at
75% of his base pay. The Army assumed the husband desired the higher amount and began making
disability payments to him. Id.
54. Id. 21 Cal. 3d at 784, 582 P.2d at 99, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
55. Id. 21 Cal. 3d at 782, 582 P.2d at 98, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
56. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
57. Id.
58. Id at 594-95.
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ruled Stenquist as to veterans' disability benefits and made the
benefits the separate property of the disabled veteran. The Supreme
Court's holding in Mansell forecloses any attempt by a state court
to directly divide disability pay. Thus, disability pay is not subject
to partition by a court at dissolution as a community asset; it is the
separate property of the disabled retiree.5 9
Interestingly, on remand the California Court of Appeals held
in In re Marriage of Mansel that Major Mansell "consented to
said act [division of his disability pay] when he signed the stip-
ulated property settlement agreement, and he is therefore barred
from complaining." 61 In short, in the property settlement agree-
ment, Major Mansell had contracted away part of his interest in his
disability pay, and the court gave it effect. Thus, he was estopped
to deny Mrs. Mansell's claim merely because he had agreed to pay
it out of his disability pay.
The decision on remand reinforces the long settled premise of
California community property law that married couples are gener-
ally free to contract around, or out of, the community property
scheme. 62 In re Marriage of Mansell upheld this concept while
explicitly recognizing the State's limitations in imposing a property
settlement.63 However, state courts have been creative in finding
59. However, there are still uncharted areas to this issue. A court may order a disabled retiree
to pay child support from his disability pay. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing
Rose); see also Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257, 1264 (Alaska 1992) (holding that a court may
consider the economic consequences of a divorcing service member's decision to waive his or her
military retirement pay so the member can receive nondivisible veteran's disability benefits in
fashioning an equitable division of marital property). The Washington Supreme Court reconciled
Washington's property distribution statute with Mansell in their recent decision, In re Kraft, 832 P.2d
871 (Wash. 1992). The Washington Supreme Court held that a dissolution court may consider a
military retiree's disability pension as an economic circumstance of the divorcing parties justifying
a disproportionate community property award to the other spouse, but may not divide the disability
pension, or value it and offset other property against that value. Id. at 875.
60. 217 Cal. App. 3d 219, 265 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1989).
61. IU. at 230, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
62. See generally CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1993); id. § 5110 (West Supp. 1993).
63. In re Marriage of Mansell, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
1824
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ways to mitigate the damage they perceive Mansell may inflict on
the non-retiree spouse.6
Mansell, McCarty, and USFSPA are the three pillars of retired
military and disability pay law. It is essential to have a sound grasp
of these principles when representing military clients or their
spouses. They also form the foundation for counseling and repre-
senting clients who are separation pay, SSB, or VSI beneficiaries.
With that in mind, let us examine the legislative history of sepa-
ration pay, SSB, and VSI before we delve into their technical
aspects.
Ill. TooLs To ASSIST THE DRAWDOWN
As part of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991,65 Congress proposed a "comprehensive package of benefits
to provide a 'safety net' for service members and their families
affected by the force drawdown." Congress perceived that sepa-
ration pay had to be enhanced to assist the drawdown. 67 The 1991
Defense Authorization Act authorized the payment of separation
64. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 419 S.E.2d 267 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (giving effect to the
divorcing couple's property settlement agreement). In Owen, the husband and wife divorced, and in
the property settlement agreement, the husband agreed to pay the wife one-half of his Army retired
pay. Id. at 268. The property settlement agreement also contained a guarantee/indemnity clause to
the effect that husband would take no action to defeat wife's interests in the retired pay and would
indemnify if he breached the agreement. Id. After retiring one year after their divorce, he was rated
60% disabled and waived retired pay to receive disability pay from the Veteran's Administration. He
attempted to reduce his wife's share of his combined retired pay and disability pay income. The court
framed the question as "whether parties may use a property settlement agreement to guarantee a
certain level of income by providing for alternative payments to compensate for a reduction in
payment level based on a reduction in retirement benefits." Id at 269-70. The court held that they
could, saying the property settlement agreement did not offend the federal prohibition against a direct
assignment of disability pay since there was no assignment of right, but merely a guarantee of
monthly support in consideration of wife's waiver of spousal support. Id at 269. Further, no source
of funds was specified. l at 269-70.
65. Pub. L. No. 101-510, Div. A, Title V, Part A, § 501, 104 Stat. 1549 (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. § 1174 (1991)).
66. H.R. REP. No. 665, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990
(emphasis added). "The committee reaffirms its belief that people are our most important asset[.]"
l
67. Id. at 2994-95 ("A principal component of the package of transition assistance benefits
necessary in a force drawdown environment is a modification of existing law with respect to the
payment of separation pay.").
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pay for involuntarily separated personnel68 with six or more years
of service who were not in their initial term of enlistment or period
of obligated service.69
Congress enacted a companion suite of transition benefits for
involuntarily separated members, including pre-separation coun-
seling,7" employment assistance,7 job training assistance through
68. Involuntary separation is defined as follows:
A member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps shall be considered to be
involuntarily separated for purposes of this chapter if the member was on active duty or
full-time National Guard duty on September 30, 1990, ad-
(1) in the case of a regular officer (other than a retired officer), the officer is
involuntarily discharged under other than adverse conditions, as characterized by the
Secretary concerned;
(2) in the case of a reserve officer who is on the active duty list or, if not on the
active-duty list, is on full-time active duty (or in the case of a member of the National
Guard, full-time National Guard duty) for the purpose of organizing, administering,
recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components, the officer is involuntarily
discharged or released from active duty or full-time National Guard (other that a release
from active duty or full-time National Guard duty incident to a transfer to retired status)
under other than adverse conditions, as characterized by the Secretary concerned;
(3) in the case of a regular enlisted member serving on active duty, the member
is (A) denied reenlistment, or (B) is involuntarily discharged under other than adverse
conditions, as characterized by the Secretary concerned; or
(4) in the case of a reserve enlisted member who is on full-time active duty (or in
the case of a member of the National Guard, full-time National Guard duty) for the
purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve
components, the member is (A) denied reenlistment, or (B) is involuntarily discharged or
released from active duty (or full-time National Guard) under other than adverse
conditions, as characterized by the Secretary concered.
Pub.L. No. 101-510, Div. A, Title V, § 1141, 104 Stat. 1551-52 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1141
(1990)).
69. H.R. REP. No. 655, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2995.
70. 10 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (1991) (mandating that separating members be counseled on
educational benefits available, i.e., the Montgomery GI Bill, disability compensation and rehabilitation
available through Veterans Affairs, affiliation with the Selected Reserve, Government and private
sector programs for job search and placement assistance, job and placement counseling for a
member's spouse, information on relocation assistance services, information on the availability of
post-separation medical and dental coverage, counseling for the member and his or her family on the
effect of career change on the family, and financial planning assistance) (italics added).
71. Id. § 1143 (1991) (providing for employment assistance). Subsection (a) directs the
Secretary of Defense to provide separated members a certification or verification of "any job skills
and experience acquired while on active duty that may have application to employment in the civilian
sector." Id. Subsection (b) requires the Secretary of Defense to establish permanent employment
assistance centers at appropriate military installations. Id. § 1143(b) (1991). Subsection (c) provides
that to assist "members . ..and their spouses in locating civilian employment and training
opportunities, the Secretary of Defense shall establish and implement procedures to release to civilian
employers, organizations, State employment agencies, and other appropriate entities the names (and
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the Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Labor,72
transitional health care,73 commissary and exchange privileges,74
use of military family housing,75 excess leave and permissive tem-
porary duty for job and house hunting,76 preference for involun-
tarily separated members to affiliate with a National Guard or
Reserve unit within one year after separation,77 and an opportunity
to participate in the Montgomery GI Bill Educational Assistance
Program.78
other pertinent information) of such members and their spouses." Id § 1143(c) (1991) (emphasis
added). "Such names may be released for such purposes only with the consent of such members and
spouses." Id Subsection (d) gives a one-time hiring preference by nonappropriated fund
instrumentalities to involuntarily separated members and their families, subordinate to hiring
preferences under § 806(a)(2) of the Military Family Act of 1985 [10 U.S.C. § 113 note). Id §
1143(d) (1991) (emphasis added).
72. Id. § 1144 (1991) (appropriating $22,000,000 over fiscal years 1991, 1992, and 1993 and
directing the Secretaries of Defense, Labor, and Veterans Affairs to "establish and maintain a program
to furnish counseling, assistance in identifying employment, and training opportunities, help in
obtaining such employment and training, and other related information and services to members of
the armed forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department who are being
separated from active duty and the spouses of such members.") (emphasis added).
73. Id § 1145 (1991) (providing for 60 days of health care for involuntarily separated
members who had less than six years active service, and 120 days of health care for involuntarily
separated members with six or more years of active service). It also provides for the purchase of
conversion health policies for the member and his or her dependents. Id.
74. Id. § 1146 (1991) (granting an involuntarily separated member the privilege of using
military exchanges and commissaries for two years from their date of involuntary separation on the
same basis as when they were on active duty). Thus, if the involuntarily separated member's
dependents were authorized commissary and exchange privileges while the member was on active
duty, they should also be authorized those privileges during the two year period the separated
member is authorized these privileges. Id
75. Id. § 1147 (1991) (allowing a service Secretary to make military family housing available
for 180 days beyond the date of separation for a member and the member's family). The services are
allowed to make a reasonable rental charge for such use of military family housing. Id.
76. Id § 1149 (1991) (directing the secretary of the military department to grant a member
who is to be involuntarily separated up to 30 days excess leave [leave without pay], or up to 10 days
of permissive temporary duty [permission to travel from the home station in a duty status without
the ability to claim travel entitlements] "in order to facilitate the member's carrying out necessary
relocation activities (such as job search and residence search activities).").
77. Id. § 1150(a) (1991) (providing that a person who is involuntarily separated between
October 1, 1990 and September 30, 1995 who applies to join the National Guard or Reserve within
one year after separation "shall be given preference over other equally qualified applicants for
existing or projected vacancies within the unit to which the member applies.")
78. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 4404, 106 Stat. 2704-2706 (1991) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3018B
(1992)).
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In the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993,' 9 Congress responded to the need to rapidly shrink the
active duty force. The Act authorizes the Defense Department to
temporarily:
(1) Offer involuntary separation pay and transition benefits
to active duty personnel who elect to voluntarily separate in
order to avoid the possibility of facing selection for invol-
untary separation or denial of reenlistment; and (2) offer a
voluntary separation incentive in the form of an annuity to
active duty personnel who elect to voluntarily separate in
order to avoid the possibility of facing selection for invol-
untary separation or denial of reenlistment.
The conferees take this action because of their concern
over the effect of strength reductions during the next few
years on our men and women in uniform and their
families.80
It is significant to note that Congress reiterated its concern for
military families originally expressed the year before.8 This con-
cem was embodied in SSB and VSI, and gave the Services an
attractive "carrot" to offer service members to encourage them to
choose SSB or VSI in lieu of the "stick" of involuntary separation.
Congress also recognized that this was the first drawdown which
involved an all-volunteer force in which many members had joined
the Armed Forces intending to make it a career, rather than joining
79. Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1290 (1991) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 114 (1991)).
80. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 311,102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1111-12 (emphasis added).
81. See supra notes 66,70-75 and accompanying text (noting extension of benefits for military
families).
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through conscription or threat of conscription. 2 Table 2 illustrates
sample values of separation pay, SSB, and VSI benefits.
Table 2. SAMPLE PAYMENT PROJECTIONS
GRADE 113 MONTHLY SEPARATION
YEARS OF PAY PAY SSB VSI
SERVICE (alo Jan 93) (§ 1174) (§ 1174a) (§ 1175)
E-4/6 $1,261.20 $9,080.64 $13,620.96 $2,270.16 p.a.
$27,241.92
over 12 years
E-5/12 $1,537.50 $22,140.00 $33,210.00 $5,533.20 p.a.
$132,796.80
over 24 years
0-3/8 $2,958.60 $28,402.56 $42,603.84 $7,100.64 p.a.
$113,610.24
over 16 years
0-4/14 $3,614.70 $60,726.96 $91,090.44 $15,181.74 p.a.
$425,088.72
over 28 years
With this background, let us look at each individual program,
starting with separation pay.
82. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 311, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1112. The committee noted:
The conferees especially recognize that this drawdown in strength is different from
previous drawdowns because it affects people who are a product of an all volunteer force.
Therefore, the conferees would provide these temporary authorities as tools to assist the
military services in selectively reducing, on a voluntary basis, that portion of the career
personnel inventory that is not retirement eligible. The conferees believe that these
authorities would give a reasonable, fair choice to personnel who would otherwise have
no option but to face selection for involuntary separation, and to risk being separated at
a point not of their own choosing.
Id.
83. Pay grade E-4 is for a Corporal or Specialist in the Marine Corps and Army, a Senior
Airman in the Air Force, and a Petty Officer Third Class in the Navy. 10 U.S.C. § 505 (1956). Pay
grade E-5 is for a Sergeant in the Army and Marine Corps, a Staff Sergeant in the Air Force, and
a Petty Officer Second Class in the Navy. Id. Pay grade 0-3 is for a Captain in the Army, Marine
Corps and Air Force, and a Lieutenant in the Navy. Id. § 741 (1956). Pay grade 0-4 is for a Major
in the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, and a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy. Id.
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IV. SEPARATION PAY
A. Separation Pay (10 U.S.C. § 1174)
Separation pay is a one-time, lump sum benefit paid to a mem-
ber who has completed a portion of a twenty year career, but is
involuntarily separated before qualifying for longevity retire-
ment.84 Prior to 1990, provisions existed to compensate involun-
tarily released officers by providing separation pay up to a maxi-
mum of $30,000. Enlisted members were not authorized sepa-
ration pay. An officer whose basic monthly pay was $3,000, and
who had ten years of service, could have expected to receive
$30,000 under the pre-1990 provisions of section 1174.
In 1990, Congress amended section 1174 to significantly
enhance its utility as a means of shrinking the active duty force. 6
Congress noted: "A principal component of the package of tran-
sition assistance benefits necessary in a force drawdown environ-
ment is a modification of existing law with respect to the payment
of separation pay."87 These modifications removed the $30,000
cap and made Reserve officers and Regular enlisted members eli-
gible for separation pay.88 Involuntarily separated Regular enlisted
members had to have served more than six but less than twenty
years to be eligible for separation pay.8 9 Congress waived the six
84. H.R. REP. No. 1462, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6361. As noted in the legislative history,
The separation pay is a contingency payment for an officer who is career committed but
to whom a full military career may be denied. It is designed to encourage him to pursue
his service ambition, knowing that if he is denied a full career under the competitive
system, he can count on an adequate readjustment pay to ease his reentry into civilian life.
Ma (Note the gender orientation of the language).
85. The formula to compute this benefit is to multiply the member's monthly base pay by 12,
multiply that product by the number of years of active service, then multiply by 10%. 10 U.S.C. §
1174 (1991).
86. Pub. L. No. 101-510, Div. A, Title V, Part A, § 501, 104 Stat. 1549 (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. § 1174 (1991)).
87. H.R. REP. No. 665, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 269 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2994-95.
88. 10 U.S.C. § 1174(b), (c)(1), (d)(1) (1991).
89. Id. § 1174(b)(1) (1991).
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year service requirement for Regular officers who had more than
five years of service?
However, separation pay is not available for Reserve officers
who have more than five but less than six years active service.91
This has created disparities because similarly situated Regular
officers are eligible for separation pay.92 Congress also reiterated
its position that, "separation pay is designed to compensate career
oriented service members who have been denied a career oppor-
tunity because of circumstances beyond their control."'93 Thus, a
service member with ten years of service and receiving a monthly
base pay of $3,000 would now receive $36,000 in separation pay
as well as involuntary separation benefits.
B. How Is Separation Pay Characterized?
Under In re Marriage of Kuzmiak,94 unless the parties have
agreed otherwise, California courts might characterize separation
pay received under the pre-1990 terms of section 1174 as the mili-
tary member's separate property. The California Appeals Court
held in Kuzmiak that the "husband's military separation pay is his
separate property unless he applies for military longevity retire-
ment."' The question is whether California courts will feel bound
to apply Kuzmiak to post-1990 separation pay.
The facts in Kuzmiak may provide a means for some parties to
be included in or excluded from its holding. Captain Kuzmiak
entered the Air Force in 1966 and was involuntarily separated from
the Air Force on February 28, 1983, almost two years after his
divorce on May 21, 1981.96 He received $30,000 in separation pay
90. Id § 1174(a)(1) (1991).
91. Id § 1174(c)(1) (1991).
92. Joe West, Some Forced Out Officers Won't Get Separation Pay, AIR FORCE TIMES, Sept.
21, 1992, at 3, col. 1.
93. H.R. REP. No. 665, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 269 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2995.
94. 176 Cal. App. 3d 1152, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1986), review denied, cert. denied sub nom,
479 U.S. 885 (1986).
95. Kuzmiak, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1154, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
96. Id. 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1153, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
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under the then effective provisions of Section 1174.17 After he
was separated as an officer, Captain Kuzmiak enlisted in the Air
Force so that he could become eligible for longevity retirement at
twenty years of service.98 The trial court had reserved jurisdiction
over the property settlement and entered a decree denominating the
$30,000 as "a community retirement benefit or payment in lieu of
retirement."' 9 Noting that Congress had stated that the purpose of
separation pay is to financially assist the member after the member
leaves the service up until the time the member obtains private
employment, the Kuzmiak court examined USFSPA and concluded
that separation pay did not fall within its scope."°
The court found that Captain Kuzmiak's ex-wife had a com-
munity interest in the $30,000 because he enlisted in the Air Force
and would have to pay back the $30,000 before he could start
drawing longevity retirement. 1' However, the court made it clear
that if Captain Kuzmiak had not enlisted and qualified for longev-
ity retirement, the $30,000 would have been his separate property
and not subject to division by the court.0 2
Should Kuzmiak be followed in light of post-1990 legislation?
An asset acquired after separation or divorce is presumably the
separate property of the person who acquires it.103 However, Mrs.
Kuzmiak's rights to her share of Captain Kuzmiak's retirement had
not been extinguished by a final order of the trial court since it had
reserved jurisdiction.1 4 Thus, when Captain Kuzmiak enlisted to
serve until he was eligible for retirement, his wife's interest in his
prospective retirement pay was revived and became subject to
97. If.
98. Id.
99. Id. 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1155-56, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 645-46.
100. Id. 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1157, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 646. The court stated:
USFSPA does not mention separation pay in defining retired or retainer pay. [Tihe right
to separation pay occurs only when there is an involuntary discharge of the service
member.
l See H.R. REP. No. 1462, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333.
101. Kuzrmiak, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1159, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
102. Id. 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1159, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
103. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5118-5119 (West 1969).
104. Kuzriak, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1155, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
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determination by the court since Captain Kuzmiak would have to
pay back the $30,000 in order to receive retirement pay.
It could be argued that a major factor in determining the char-
acterization of separation pay as separate property is the involun-
tary nature of the separation. This is especially true for separation
pay received after marital separation or divorce. Congress made it
clear that separation pay is not compensation for past services, but
is to aid the involuntarily separated member's transition back to
civilian life after being deprived of a twenty year career and its
attendant retirement benefits."05 However, the community property
presumption still must be overcome if the separation pay was
acquired during marriage. The Kuzmiak court explicitly recognized
the impact of involuntary separation on the community, noting in
dicta: "If a marriage subsists at the time the service member is
involuntarily discharged, the loss of employment becomes a com-
munity loss and separation pay serves to ameliorate this loss. ' '1°6
A distinction based upon the time at which a service member
is discharged is critically important in overcoming an argument
where Kuzmiak is cited as authority for characterizing separation
pay as separate property, regardless of when received. Recall that
the Kuzmiaks separated on May 21, 1981, and Captain Kuzmiak
was involuntarily separated from the Air Force on February 28,
1983.107 If a hypothetical Captain Smith and her husband were
married when she was involuntarily separated, and they later
divorced, the Kuzmiak court's dicta indicates a recognition that
separation pay is a community asset, absent any other agreement
of the parties, because the entire community has to make the tran-
sition and adjustment to civilian life and employment.1°8
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing Kuzrniak's characterization of
separation pay and analysis of congressional intent).
106. Kuzmiak, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1157, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47 (emphasis added).
107. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (summarizing the facts of Kuzmiak).
108. Kuzmiak, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 1157, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47.
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A spouse's community property interest in his or her spouse's
military retirement pay is earned as it accrues. 109 Involuntary
separation from the Armed Forces cuts off that interest, resulting
in damage to the community. However, neither spouse has volun-
tarily acted to prejudice the other's interests in the prospective
retirement, and both spouse's interests are equally injured.
A literal reading of congressional intent, when Congress
amended the separation pay statute in 1990 and passed ancillary
separation benefit legislation, supports a division of separation pay
as community property."0 As noted, Congress stated that the
1990 changes to involuntary separation pay, and the transition pro-
grams it enacted, were to provide a safety net for members and
their families."' This conclusion dignifies Congress' concern for
the military family, serves to compensate the spouse whose interest
in his or her spouse's prospective retirement is involuntarily extin-
guished, and is in harmony with the protective philosophy of
California community property law.
An even more compelling argument to characterize separation
pay as community property arises if the member was eligible for
SSB or VSI (both voluntary programs), consciously chose to forego
those programs, preferring instead to "ride out" the drawdown in
hopes of avoiding involuntary separation, and was later involun-
tarily separated. The military member's unilateral action to decline
SSB or VSI with the resulting involuntary separation allows the
injured spouse to argue that a unilateral decision by one spouse can-
not act to cut off the other spouse's community property interests
in an asset."' This argument is buttressed if the evidence showed
109. See generally In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592,596, 517 P.2d 449,451, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 371 (1974); Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 330, 605 P.2d 10, 13, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502,505
(1980) (concluding that, under California law, a spouse's entitlement to a share of the community
property accrues at the time the property is acquired).
110. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text (providing a general discussion of military
separation benefits).
111. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing In re Marriage of Stenquist).
It is generally recognized that a military member's spouse is probably the most influential factor in
career decisions. Most military couples spend a great deal of time deciding whether or not to "take
the money and run." The bottom line, however, is that the final decision is the member's alone to
make, and the member must be prepared to live with the attendant consequences, not all of which
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the parties jointly consented to this course of action, thus making
it a community decision. This argument, however, is admittedly
predicated on the unproven assertion that SSB and VSI should pro-
perly be characterized as community property. With that in mind,
let us examine SSB and VSI.
V. SSB AND VSI
A. Special Separation Benefits (10 U.S.C. § 1174a)
SSB is an outgrowth of the concepts and policies concerning
separation pay codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1174. SSB incorporates por-
tions of section 1174 by reference. 113 It is a limited-term statute
which increases by half the amount of separation pay for which a
service member is eligible.'14 SSB is calculated the same as sec-
tion 1174 separation pay except that the multiplier is fifteen percent
instead of ten percent., 5 Under section 1174a, a service member
with ten years of service and a monthly base pay of $3,000 would
now receive $54,000. SSB contains a sunset provision which ter-
minates the benefit after September 30, 1995.'16
Some may view SSB merely as a temporary expansion of sepa-
ration pay, limited in time and focused in scope, destined to be
relegated to the statutory boneyard after it has served its purpose.
Proponents of this position argue that Congress did not intend to
materially change the underlying purpose of separation pay and
was reacting only to a temporary need. Instead, it is suggested that
Congress merely reiterated the purpose for the pay, and it would be
are foreseeable.
113. 10 U.S.C § 1174a(g) (1991) (incorporating 10 U.S.C § 1174 (e) through (h), with the
exception of subsection (e)(2)(A), by reference). Subsection (g) of § 1174a establishes a requirement
for involuntarily separated members to serve in the Ready Reserve for three years as a condition of
accepting separation pay. Id. § 1174a(g) (1991). Subsection (e)(2)(A) exempts a member from
Reserve service who is discharged or released from active duty at his request and exempts members
from receiving separation pay. Id. § 1174(e)(2)(A) (1991). This exemption is not found in § 1175.
114. Id § 1174a(b)(2)(A) (1991).
115. Id.
116. Id § 1174(h) (1991).
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incongruous for California courts to characterize SSB payments dif-
ferently from separation pay.1 17
However, the counter-argument is that the voluntary nature of
SSB, coupled with Congress' underlying intent to ease the transi-
tion of military families back to civilian life,"'8 distinguishes SSB
from separation pay. It would be inconsistent for a California court
to allow a spouse to unilaterally transmute community property to
separate property, unless specifically provided for, such as in
Mansell."1 9 Therefore, SSB should be characterized as community
property and divided accordingly.
B. Voluntary Separation Incentive (10 U.S.C. § 1175)
VSI is different in form than separation pay and SSB. VSI is
an annuity which is paid for twice the number of years a member
was on active duty. 20 For example, a service member with ten
years of service, and a monthly base pay of $3,000, would receive
twenty annual payments of $9,000 for a total of $180,000. VSI was
crafted by the Department of Defense. Then-Secretary of Defense
Cheney personally lobbied Congress for this particular benefit.'
Although Congress passed the measure essentially as presented,
they expressed reservations concerning its provisions, mostly
having to do with funding VSI.122
117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the characterization of separation
pay under Kuzmiak).
118. See supra notes 66, 70-75.
119. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
120. VSI is an annuity that is based on two and one-half percent of a member's monthly basic
pay multiplied by 12. I0 U.S.C § 1175(e)(1) (1991). The product is then multiplied by the number
of years the member served on active duty. Id.
121. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 311, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 556 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1112 ("The conferees note the Secretary of Defense's personal efforts to press the
conferees for the adoption of the voluntary separation incentive be [sic] proposed.").
122. Id. at 1112-13. Congress also noted:
Although several features of the revised proposal required further examination, the
conferees decided to adopt, with the exception of the funding feature, the Secretary's
revised proposal as submitted. The conferees did this largely on the basis of the
Secretary's stated urgent need for the incentive. With regard to the funding of the
voluntary separation incentive, the conferees believe that fiscal responsibility requires
accrual funding of this benefit, and the Secretary concurs. It is on the basis of the
1836
1993 / Characterizing Military Separation Benefits at Dissolution
For many, VSI is an attractive alternative to the lump-sum SSB
payment. It spreads the tax consequences over a number of years
and provides a predictable, stable, annual income.' 23 Other fea-
tures of VSI also suggest that a California court could conclude
that VSI is an asset which is to be treated like a retirement
substitute and be subject to division at dissolution as community
property.
One of VSI's key components is that annuitant can devise their
right to receive future VSI payments. 24 However, the right to
receive VSI payments cannot be transferred inter vivos. 2 For
example, a fourteen-year Major who separates at age thirty-five,
will receive payments for twenty-eight years, until the Major is
sixty-three. If the Major dies before all the payments are received,
she can designate a beneficiary in the Major's will to receive the
126remaining VSI payments.
Thus, the argument is that, since a VSI annuitant can devise the
remaining VSI payments, Congress intended VSI solely for the
annuitant's benefit, and therefore VSI is separate property. This
argument is strengthened by the absence of a statutory requirement
agreement that the voluntary separation incentive would be funded on an accrual basis that
the conferees accept the Secretary's revised proposal.
Il
123. VSI also has some significant restrictions which may make it a less attractive alternative.
For example, 10 U.S.C. § 1175(e)(2) (1991) requires a member who selects VSI and is also entitled
to basic pay for active or reserve service, or compensation for inactive duty training, to forfeit VSI
payments up to the amount of basic pay received. Subsection (e)(3) requires a member who later
becomes eligible to receive retired pay to pay back the VSI benefit out of retired pay. Id. §
1175(e)(3) (1991). This is similar to the re-capture provision for separation pay paid under § 1174.
See id. § 1174(h) (1991). Subsection (e)(4) has an offset provision similar to that disabled retired
members encounter when they receive disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Compare id § 1175(e)(4) (1991) with 38 U.S.C. § 5305 (1991). Under the latter statute, retired pay
is reduced by the amount of disability pay received. Id VSI has essentially the same feature. 10
U.S.C. § 1175(e)(4) (1991). Subsection (f) makes the annuity payments non-transferable. Id. § 1175()
(1991). However, the annuitant may designate beneficiaries to receive the annuity payments after he
or she dies. l This could be a significant estate planning tool. However, there is also no mechanism
to adjust VSI payments for inflation, so the actual cash value of the annuity declines dramatically
over time, especially with some annuities being paid over periods of 20 to 30 years.
124. 10 U.S.C. § 1175(f) (1991).
125. Id
126. Id
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that the remaining annuity payments be devised to the decedent's
surviving spouse or issue.
However, if VSI were characterized as community property, the
VSI annuitants would only be able to devise their community prop-
erty share of the VSI annuity. The remaining half would be subject
to a surviving spouse's claim. If the decedent did not name a bene-
ficiary in a will, the remaining VSI payments should generally pass
through the residuary clause. 27 If the decedent died intestate, the
right to receive VSI payments would pass according to the state's
statutory scheme for distributing the intestate decedent's estate.
As with SSB, we must look at why VSI was established and its
nature. VSI is a tool to help drawdown the active duty force by
providing an incentive for members to voluntarily separate before
completing a twenty year career. There is nothing to indicate that
Congress wished to preempt a state's ability to divide SSB or VSI
benefits according to state law. Congress' stated ijptent of caring for
the military family supports a conclusion that these benefits should
be characterized as community property.
However, there is a California case, In re Marriage of
DeShurley,12 8 which discusses the characterization of non-military
separation pay which could influence how a court will characterize
SSB or VSI payments.
C. In Re Marriage of DeShurley
The recent California case of In re Marriage of DeShurley129
must be addressed since it may influence characterization of SSB
and VSI upon dissolution. In DeShurley, the husband elected to
receive separation pay from Continental Airlines, which was in
bankruptcy at the time, in exchange for waiving his right to be
127. See CA.. PROB. CODE § 100 (1990) (indicating that if no beneficiary is designated, VSI
benefits should become part of the deceased annuitant's residuary estate). See generally Maj. A.
Peterson, VSI Entitlements: Dispositions at Death of Recipient, ARMY LAW, Department of the Army
Pamphlet No. 27-50-240, Nov., 1992, at 41.
128. 207 Cal. App. 3d 992, 255 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1989).
129. I,/
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recalled after a labor strike.130 Mr. DeShurley was to receive
$126,800 in separation pay over a six year period.13 1 During his
divorce, he claimed it to be his separate property, and the trial
court agreed. 132 The court of appeals concurred, saying that there
were three characteristics to the severance pay: (1) it was derived
from a (bankruptcy) court order; (2) it was an option that Mr.
DeShurley could choose, the other choice being to return to work;
and (3) the amount of severance pay was based on his length of
employment.13 3 The court rather tersely concluded that, "based on
all relevant circumstances, John's severance pay represents present
compensation for loss of earnings and is therefore his separate
property."" The DeShurley court relied on the language in In re
Marriage of Horn135 which said the character of the benefits is
to be determined by considering all relevant circumstances.136
An attempt to overlay DeShurley's holding directly onto cir-
cumstances involving SSB and VSI payments results in an ill
fit.137 SSB and VSI obviously do not derive from a court order,
rather they are statutory, voluntary, and are based on length of ser-
vice, but that does not constitute all the relevant circumstances.
130. Id. at 994, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. 209 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
134. Id. 209 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
135. 181 Cal. App. 3d 540, 226 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1986).
136. DeShurley, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
137. But see Captain Allison A. Polchek, Recent Property Settlement Development Issues for
Legal Assistance Attorneys, ARMY LAW, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-241, Dec., 1992,
at 11. Captain Polchek concluded:
Like the separation pay option in DeShurley, VSI and SSB are not truly voluntary.
Congress noted that the payments would give a 'fair choice to personnel who would
otherwise have no option but to face selection for involuntary separation, and to risk being
separated at a point not of their own choosing.' Accordingly, under DeShurley, a divorce
court should not characterize VSI or SSB payments as community property.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 311, 556, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 908,
1112). However, in the first sentence of the paragraph Captain Polchek references, Congress noted,
"The conferees take this action because of their concern over the effect of strength reductions during
the next few years on our men and women in uniform and theirfamilies.'" H.R. REP. No. 311, at 556,
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1112 (emphasis added). A better reading, in light of the fact that this
is the first time that a reduction of this scale had been done since the inception of the all-volunteer
force, would be that Congress meant what they said-these benefits were for the separated member
and his or her family.
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There is the issue of the transformation of the spouse's earned
interest in the member's contingent retirement which is divested
when the member elects VSI or SSB. In In re Marriage of
Brown, 38 the California Supreme Court held that vested and
unvested pension rights should be treated the same.139 Justice
Tobriner wrote: "Pension rights, whether or not vested, represent
a property interest; to the extent that such rights derive from
employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset
subject to division in 'a dissolution proceeding."' 4  The question
is whether a member's acceptance of SSB or VSI is a compromise
of non-vested pension rights.
Even after the final dissolution decree and property distribution,
if retirement interests or separation benefits are not addressed in the
property settlement agreement, Henn v. Henn'4 supports the
proposition that an omitted community property asset retains its
community property character and can be divided after a final
decree has been issued.142 Thus, a spouse who divorced a military
member before the member was involuntarily separated, or selected
SSB or VSI, and who holds an undivided interest in the military
member's retirement benefits, holds that interest with the former
spouse as a tenant in common until the property is partitioned. 14
3
CONCLUSION
Separation pay, SSB, and VSI benefits could well form the bulk
of a recently separated military family's assets. Proper character-
ization of these benefits as either community or separate property
138. 15 Cal. 3d 830, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
139. L. 15 Cal. 3d at 843, 544 P.2d at 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
140. Id.
141. Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980) (holding: (1) that
to the extent a pension is earned during marriage, it is the parties' community property; and (2)
property left unadjudicated by a dissolution decree can be divided in a subsequent action).
142. l 26 Cal. 3d at 330, 605 P.2d at 13, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 505. See In re Marriage of Curtis,
7 Cal. App. 4th 1, 8, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 148 (1992) (noting "it was settled that California courts
have the power to reopen dissolution actions to divide omitted assets if the complaining spouse had
an interest in that asset at the time of dissolution."); see also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying
text (discussing Casas v. Thompson).
143. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d at 330, 605 P.2d at 13, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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is vital to an equitable division of marital assets. Mischaracter-
ization could dramatically affect the post-dissolution finances of
both parties.
The circumstances under which the 1990 and 1991 legislation
was passed support a conclusionthat post-1990 separation pay,
SSB, and VSI are community property assets. Congress affirma-
tively stated their desire to provide a "safety net" for military
families affected by the drawdown. Their 1990 amendments to 10
U.S.C. § 1174, the SSB and VSI legislation, and Congress' tradi-
tional deference to the states in the area of domestic relations,
alters the conclusion of the Kuzmiak court that Congress intended
these benefits solely for the welfare of the separating military
member.
Nevertheless, the Kuzmiak holding that separation pay is the
separate property of the service member presents a formidable hur-
dle to overcome. The Kuzmiak court relied heavily on congress-
ional intent embodied in USFSPA in arriving at its decision.'
44
Kuzmiak's reliance on congressional intent provides the ammu-
nition to overcome it. The legislative history of the 1990 amend-
ments to separation pay and the SSB and VSI legislation is rife
with Congress' expressions of concern for the military family.
Applying Stenquist's45 admonition that one spouse cannot unilat-
erally impair the community property interest of the other spouse
leads to the logical conclusion that these benefits should properly
be characterized as community property. 46 Kuzmiak is also dis-
tinguishable by the fact that the separation was involuntary instead
of voluntary, as it would be under SSB or VSL.
Of course, Congress can preempt state domestic relations law
concerning the characterization of federal benefits. 47 The ques-
tion is whether Congress intended to preempt state law in this area.
A thorough reading of the legislative history leads to the con-
clusion that there was no "direct and specific" legislation on this
144. In reMarriage of Kuzmiak, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1152,1158,222 Cal. Rptr. 644,647(1986),
review denied, cert. denied sub nom, 479 U.S. 885 (1986).
145. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
146. Il 21 Cal. 3d at 782, 582 P.2d at 98, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
147. Curtis v. Curtis, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1, 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 145, 150 (1991).
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point, such as the Mansell court found when it held disability pay
to be the separate property of the disabled spouse. Additionally,
separation pay, SSB and VSI do not fall under USFSPA. The next
question is whether a substantial federal interest is gravely threat-
ened or harmed if California courts characterize these benefits as
community property.148 As mentioned, Congress specifically con-
structed a safety net for the military member and the member's
family in order to drawdown the active duty armed forces. The
ancillary benefits were targeted at the member and, in most cases,
the spouse. It is hard to imagine which federal interests would be
gravely threatened or harmed if post-1990 separation pay, SSB, or
VSI were to be characterized as community property at dissolution,
especially in light of the overwhelmingly pro-family legislative his-
tory. The logical conclusion is that, absent a clear congressional
mandate, state law should control the division of those assets.
Brown's holding, concerning non-vested pension rights, sup-
ports the proposition that the non-member spouse has a property
interest in the contingent retirement which is extinguished by an
involuntary separation. 49 However, it is inconsistent to suggest
that a spouse's earned community property interest in a contingent
retirement plan is somehow magically transmuted into the separate
property of one spouse because the member chooses a voluntary
separation benefit that cuts off the other spouse's earned retirement
interest. Admittedly, this facile sleight-of-hand is precisely what
occurred in Kuzniak, although Captain Kuzmiak's separation was
involuntary. Under Kuzmiak, if the former military member quali-
fies for military retirement pay in the future, the former spouse's
interest in the retirement pay is magically resurrected. But, where
does this earned property interest go in the interim-to contingent
interest purgatory? The proper result is for the benefit to be con-
sistently characterized as community property, regardless of the
form it has assumed when the division is made.
148. See Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal. 3d 131, 144, 720 P.2d 921, 929, 228 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41
(1986) (analyzing whether USFSPA impliedly preempts state law).
149. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 843,544 P.2d 561,562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
634-35 (1976).
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As for SSB and VSI, the key fact to remember is that they are
voluntary programs. The right to receive SSB or VSI is based on
the member making a voluntary decision to leave active duty. Inci-
dent to that decision, the spouse's contingent interest in the mem-
ber's potential retirement is cut short, making SSB and VSI essen-
tially a settlement of future retirement rights. Again, Stenquist's
and Brown's logic seem to compel a court to characterize these
benefits as community property.
The voluntary nature of these programs should allow California
courts to characterize SSB or VSI as community property with a
clear conscience. This equitable result recognizes the contributions
of the non-member spouse, compensates spouses for their earned
interest in the contingent pension, and dignifies Congress' intent to
provide a "safety net" for military families affected by the draw-
down.
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